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1. Introduction 
   
The main factors which characterised Bangladesh’s political 
evolution in 2015 were the emergence of radical Islamic terrorism, the 
continuation of the trials related to the war crimes committed by pro-
Pakistani organisations during the 1971 civil war, the continuation of the 
Rana Plaza case
1
 and the positive evolution of relations with India.  
In a country which, since its foundation, has been dominated by a 
combination of autocracy, political violence, Islamic extremism and 
terrorism, the spread of the radical Islam threat was more than predictable. 
In such a climate, it is difficult to define the dividing line between the 
domestic and IS (Islamic State) related roots of the wave of terrorism 
which engulfed the country in the year under review. But it is a fact that, 
in 2015, Bangladesh was wracked by continual attacks against exponents 
of the civil society, against Christians and foreigners, and by a massive 
return of political violence.
2
  
It is worth stressing that, in 2015, political violence changed its 
targets and strategy. In 2013, when it had reached unprecedented heights 
since 1971, violence was characterised by riots and hartals,
3
 which 
targeted mostly political activists and law enforcing subjects.
4
 In 2015, 
violence was directed mainly against the common people,
5
 including 
children. Its dimensions were such as to make many analysts fearful of 
serious adverse consequences even for the promising Bangladeshi 
economy.  
The description of the violence that upset Bangladesh in 2015, 
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which will be given below, may seem exceedingly detailed. However, it is 
necessary to realise that, although the international media have 
concentrated almost entirely on the attacks taking place in the West, the 
same situation has held true in other parts of the world, including 
Bangladesh. Indeed, Africans and Asians were exposed to the same threats 
faced by Westerners.  
 
 
2. The first anniversary of Hasina’s second term (and its aftermath)  
 
The year began with the government’s restrictions over the 
celebrations, on 5 January, of the first anniversary of the 2014 election 
and the opposition’s protests, which signalled the return to «uncertainty in 
the political landscape of Bangladesh».
6
 
A few days earlier, police and sand-laden lorries had blocked 
Khaleda Zia—leader of the main opposition party, the Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP)—in her office in Dhaka, allegedly to protect her. 
Long-distance bus services were suspended and gatherings were banned. 
Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, the BNP secretary general, was arrested, while 
many other party leaders went into hiding. Tariq Rahman, Khaleda Zia’s 
son living in London to escape the consequences of corruption charges, 
publicly incited the Bangladeshi people to overthrow the government. The 
owner of the television station that broadcast his speech was arrested, 
although allegedly not for political reasons, but because charged with 
pornography. Mahfuz Anam, editor of the Daily Star, condemned the 
«mindless suppression of the opposition».
7
 Mohammad Ershad, former 
dictator and leader of the Jatiya Party, Bangladesh’s third largest party and 
a League ally, warned that his party’s ministers could quit the 
government.  
The Awami League celebrated the anniversary as «Constitution and 
Democracy Protection Day», while the opposition renamed it 
«Democracy killing day».
8
 After the assassination of two BNP members, 
allegedly killed by Awami League activists in the northern district of 
Natore, the BNP called an indefinite national transport strike. The month-
long blockade turned immediately into turmoil. Bombs were thrown into 
two buses and about 60 people died in clashes.
9
  
In spite of this new spell of violence, a year after her electoral 
success, Sheikh Hasina seemed firmly in control and appeared to be 
strengthened by international support. The US government, which in 2014 
                                                 
6 Ibid. p. 2. 
7 ‘Drama queens’, The Economist, 10 January 2015.  
8 Ibid. 
9 ‘On fire’, The Economist, 7 January 2015. 
had expressed much criticism of Hasina’s policy, «stopped putting public 
pressure on the Bangladeshi government».
10
 
In 2015, the trial against those responsible for war crimes during the 
1971 liberation war continued, with two more executions.  
 
 
3. The trial goes on 
 
The trial against the 1971 war criminals, started by the Awami 
League in 2010, went on among the usual controversies and violent 
retaliations.
11
 Since the beginning of the trial, the court had prosecuted 17 
people.
12
 In spite of internal and international criticism, the sentences 
were severe. In February 2015, the tribunal ordered the execution of 
Abdus Subhan, age 79, former vice-president of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), 
declared guilty of six out of nine charges, including murder, genocide and 
torture. According to the prosecutors, during the 1971 war, Subhan was 
the head of the JI and of a pro-Pakistani militia in the district of Pabna, in 
the north-west of Bangladesh. Subhan was accused of having murdered 
hundreds of villagers in his area, most of them Hindus. 
After the sentence was passed, some disorder occurred outside the 
court, where three Molotov bombs were thrown by suspected opponents 
of the government.
13
 On 16 June 2015, the Supreme Court upheld the 
death penalty for 67 year old Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mojaheed, Jamaat-e-
Islami’s Secretary General, charged with abduction, torture, genocide and 
the killing of intellectuals. Mojaheed had been a minister in the Khaleda 
Zia government between 2001 and 2006. The Jamaat-e-Islami 
immediately called a 24-hour nationwide strike.
14
 At the end of July, the 
death sentence for the opposition leader and former BNP Member of 
Parliament Salauddin Quader Chowdhury, aged 68, was also upheld. 
Chowdhury was proved guilty of nine charges out of 23, including 
genocide, murder, torment, and forced and unfair extradition of people. 
Chowdhury committed the crimes while supporting Pakistan’s occupation 
forces during the 1971 liberation war and made use of his house in 
Chittagong as a torture detention centre. Among Chowdhury’s victims 
were Sheikh Mozaffar Ahmed, the founder of the Awami League in 
Chittagong, and his son Sheikh Alamgir.  
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BNP and JI activists loudly protested against what they claimed to 
be an unfair sentence. However these protests remained at the verbal 
level, as the BNP and JI did not call for agitation. By then, after the three 
month long nationwide blockade, the opposition was politically 
weakened.
15
  
 
 
3.1. The executions 
 
On 18 November, the Supreme Court rejected the petitions filed by 
Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mojaheed and Salauddin Quader Chowdhury and 
once again upheld the death sentences. The Jamaat called for protests the 
following day,
16
 but to no avail, as the two men were hanged on 22 
November. The opposition immediately called for a general strike but, in 
order to prevent major disorders, thousands of police and border guards 
were deployed in Dhaka, Faridpur and Raojan, respectively Mojaheed’s 
and Chowdhury’s hometowns, where the funerals were held on the 
morning of 22 November. The Awami League’s supporters greeted the 
executions and held parties in the streets, distributing sweets
17
 while, 
thanks to the massive police deployment, protests were muted. The 
general strike went on without demonstrations and the day was peaceful. 
The Prime Minister has, however, been sharply criticised. Since the 
beginning of the trial, the main charge was that Sheikh Hasina was 
exploiting the trial for political gain. Some analysts warned that the 
executions might provoke further bloodshed in Bangladesh. However, it is 
a fact that an overwhelming majority of people were in favour of the trial 
and the execution of the war criminals.
18
  
The issue provoked tensions with Pakistan. On 22 November, 
Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar expressed «deep concern 
and anguish» over the executions.
19
 This statement provoked an 
immediate reaction from the Bangladeshi Foreign Minister, A.H. Mahmud 
Ali, who publicly criticized his counterpart and recalled the Bangladeshi 
envoy in Dhaka. As a response, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry recalled its 
deputy High Commissioner in Bangladesh.
20
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Some observers pointed to the trial as the main source of political 
polarisation,
21
 but this view appears simplistic and biased to this author. 
Even if the death penalty is objectionable, justice had to be done for the 
1971 war crimes. 
While the sentences were issued and the political confrontation 
turned increasingly bitter, violence proliferated and manifested itself in a 
number of attacks against multiple targets, especially exponents of the 
secular civil society and minorities.  
 
 
4. Political violence and its multiple shapes 
 
By the end of February 2015, strikes, blockades, protests and arson 
had caused 30 deaths (many, including children, burned to death) and 
hundreds of injuries, while more than 7,000 people had been arrested.
22
 
Many analysts compared the 2015 violence with the 2013 riots, but the 
2015 wave of violence differed from that of two years previously. In 
2013, the violence took the shape of clashes between at least two different 
factions: the supporters of the Awami League government and its 
opponents, especially the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami followers. In contrast, 
as already pointed out, the violence in 2015 was indiscriminate, directed 
against the common man, characterised by attacks on the crowd carried 
out by politically oriented gangs trained in urban guerrilla actions. Buses 
were the preferred targets: bombs were thrown inside them or they were 
set on fire, causing severe casualties and panic. Moreover, private 
properties and vehicles were looted and damaged or destroyed. By the end 
of January 2015, more than 600 motorcycles had been burned. The 
perpetrators were clearly connected with the opposition, especially with 
the BNP. The violence was indeed the uncontrolled result of the BNP’s 
call for strikes. The outburst of violence in February 2015 has been 
correctly defined «as the most anti-people, unimaginative, cruel and 
destructive programme that the BNP is embarking on».
23
 This agenda 
alienated the already low public support for the BNP and other opposition 
parties.  
In the following months, the features of the violence changed and 
differentiated. They took three main shapes: attacks against secular 
writers and media people, especially bloggers; attacks on foreigners and 
minorities, especially Christians; and terrorism.  
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4.1. Secular and independent media under attack 
 
In 2015, four bloggers were hacked to death. All the killings were 
executed with identical modality. All the victims were attacked by masked 
assailants who acted in groups of between two and four men. All the 
victims were butchered with cold weapons, such as machetes, knives or 
meat cleavers. On 26 February 2015, Avijit Roy, a US national born to a 
Bangladeshi Hindu family in 1972, was killed in the street in Dhaka. His 
wife, Rafida Ahmed Bonia, was also seriously injured in the attack. On 
his Facebook profile, Roy defined himself «as an engineer by profession 
and a writer by passion».
24
 Avijit Roy had founded his own blog, Mukto 
Mona, and also contributed to other blogs and newspapers. He had 
authored about ten books on secularism and against religious fanaticism. 
Roy’s most famous book was Biswasher Virus («Virus of Faith»). In his 
writing, he frequently compared religion to a disease and denied any 
scientific reliability in the Koran. His views about Islam were very 
radical, as he did not acknowledge the existence of any tolerant stream in 
the Muslim religion. Roy publicly condemned the attack on the school in 
Peshawar and on Charlie Hebdo in Paris, and debated provocative issues 
like homosexuality, upsetting many conservative Bangladeshis.
25
 In spite 
of death threats, Roy had just arrived from the US a week before being 
killed. On 29 March 2015, another secular blogger, Washiqur Rahman 
Babu, age 27, was assassinated in Dhaka. He was so maimed that the 
police identified him from his voter card. Washiqur Rahman had attacked 
the fundamentalists in his blog.
26
 On 12 May 2015, Ananta Bijoy Das, 32 
years old, was murdered in Sylhet. Das was a banker, a progressive writer 
and editor of the science fiction magazine Jukti. He was also an activist in 
the Gonojagoron Mancha («People’s Resurgence Platform»), an 
organisation connected to the Shahbag Square movement, supporting the 
International Crimes Tribunal and the death penalty for the criminals.
27
 
Das was connected with Avijit Roy, as he had written blogs for Roy’s 
Mukto Mona. Das had also criticised Islamic fundamentalism in his blog. 
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Within a few hours of Das’ murder, a message was posted on Twitter by 
somebody concealing himself behind the nickname «Ansar Bangla 8», 
claiming responsibility for assassinating the blogger. Apparently, the 
nickname referred to the Ansar Bangla or Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), 
namely an extremist organisation implicated in various criminal activities, 
including murder and bank robbery. The same username later tweeted the 
message: «Al-Qaeda in Indian Sub-Continent (AQIS) claimed 
responsibility of [sic] killing  Ananta Bijoy in Sylhet.».
28
 AQIS posted 
another message in Justpaste.it, threatening those who insulted Allah and 
the Prophet Mohammed.
29
  
The police headquarters asked the Home Ministry to ban ABT for its 
involvement in several attacks on secular bloggers and writers.
30
 One 
more attack took place on 6 August, when 28 year old Niloy Chatterjee— 
pen name Niloy Neel—was killed in his flat in Dhaka. Chatterjee too was 
a Hindu and belonged to the Gonojagoron Mancha. Responsibility for the 
murder was claimed by an organisation named Ansar al-Islam, apparently 
a local affiliation of Al-Qaeda. Niloy’s wife reported that her husband had 
tried to file a complaint about having been threatened, but the police had 
refused to receive it.
31
  
On 31 October, two attacks took place in Dhaka against two 
publishers. Both had printed Avijit Roy’s books. During the first attack, 
the office of the Shudhdhoswar publishing house was assaulted by three 
men carrying cold weapons. The publisher, Ahmed Rahim Tutul, was in a 
conversation with two writers when the killers broke into his room. Both 
Tutul and the two writers were seriously wounded and had to be 
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hospitalised.
32
 During the second attack, which occurred a few hours later, 
Faisal Arefin Dipan, head of the publishing house Jagriti Prakashani, was 
assaulted in his office in the Shahbag area and stabbed to death.
33
 Both 
publishers had filed a complaint with the police claiming they were being 
threatened.
34
 However, in these cases again the police did not take any 
precautions.
35
  
The attacks on the two publishers have been claimed by AQIS’s 
affiliate Ansar-al-Islam. In a message sent to the media, Ansar-al-Islam 
asserted: «These two publishers were worse than the writers of such 
books, as they helped to propagate those books and paid the blasphemers 
[a] handsome amount of money for writing them».
36
 
After the attacks on the publishers, writers and citizens alike turned 
out in large numbers for a rally on the streets of Dhaka on 3 November, 
asserting the right to free speech.
37
  
The attacks on bloggers and publishers have been strongly criticised 
by several eminent voices including the Committee to Protect Journalists, 
the Blogger and Online Activist Network, and Human Rights Watch, who 
urged Sheikh Hasina to take steps to ensure the safety of secular writers in 
Bangladesh.
38
 About 150 writers, including Salman Rushdie, Margaret 
Atwood, Yann Martel and Colm Tóibín, signed a letter condemning the 
attacks and asking the government to take measures to prevent similar 
events.
39
  
The role of the police is not clear. At least three victims had sought 
help from the police, who did not take any steps to protect them, even 
when the blogger issue had clearly become an emergency. The Inspector 
General of Police, after defending the free thinkers, declared that 
respecting religious feelings is a duty, so much so that: «Any offender of 
religious beliefs may get the highest punishment of 14 years».
40
 Many 
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labelled the Bangladeshi bloggers «atheists», but none of them published 
any blasphemous message.
41
  
The attacks had several aspects in common: the targets, the methods 
and the weapons. As far as the methods are concerned, they were clearly 
inspired by the Charlie Hebdo assault. This aspect can be explained in two 
ways. The attackers may have been affiliated to IS and therefore shared its 
targets and methods; or they could just be politically motivated local 
gangs, who flaunted their affiliation to radical Islam and emulated its 
methods, but pursued different goals, most probably connected to local 
politics. The victims have some common features. Two were Hindus and 
two belonged to Gonojagoron Mancha. They were not common people, 
but they had the capacity to voice some of the values that the government 
was trying to promote, like the trial of the war criminals, secularism, 
freedom of speech and belief. These assassinations, therefore, could not 
just be directed against the offenders of Islam, as officially claimed, but 
targeted government policies, particularly the war crimes trials. 
Gonojagoron Mancha started in 2013 in connection with the above quoted 
Shahbag Square movement and can be considered the Shahbag online 
voice. Gonojagoron Mancha rapidly became a nationwide movement, 
demanding capital punishment for war criminals and safeguarding of the 
«nation’s secular ideals that were attained through the liberation war in 
1971».
42
  
In September 2015, the ABT published a hit list of 18 secular 
bloggers, writers and activists to be killed if they did not stop criticising 
radical Islam or writing about «blasphemous» topics. The targets were not 
only Bangladeshis living in the country, but also Bangladeshi nationals 
based abroad, individuals with dual nationality, and citizens of Western 
countries. The list includes nine persons living in the UK, seven in 
Germany, two in the US and one in Canada.
43
 A prominent name in the 
list was Taslima Nasreen, who has lived under police protection in India 
for the past 21 years, after receiving death threats from Muslim 
fundamentalists.
44
 Some individuals in the list declared their decision to 
continue writing and blogging. Some of them approached the police after 
the publication of the list. The authorities seem to have taken the matter 
seriously and advised the writers to take precautions to reduce the risk of 
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attack.
45
  
It is unclear if the ABT has the capacity to act abroad, but the 
publication of the list may be a call for action potentially capable of 
triggering a witch hunt outside Bangladesh. The publication of the black 
list, indeed, may call for «lone wolf» action around the world.
46
  
 
 
4.2. Attacks on foreigners and religious minorities 
 
On 28 September, the Italian aid worker Cesare Tavella was killed 
on a street in Gulshan, Dhaka’s diplomatic area, while he was jogging. A 
50 year old veterinary surgeon, Tavella was working as project manager 
for the Dutch NGO ICCO, within the programme Cooperation’s Profitable 
Opportunities for Food Security (PROOFS). Witnesses reported that the 
assailants fled on a motorcycle and that one of them was carrying a gun. 
The forensic expert Qazi Md Abu Sharma, after inspecting Tavella’s body, 
told the media that the Italian aid worker had been «shot three times from 
behind at close range» with a revolver.
47
 The American SITE Intelligence 
Group, which monitors online activities of radical Islam, reported a 
statement released shortly after the murder, where IS claimed that a 
«security detachment» had tracked Tavella through the streets of Dhaka 
and killed him with «silenced weapons». The statement warned that 
foreigners should not feel confident in Muslim lands. It announced more 
attacks in Bangladesh on citizens belonging to «the crusader coalition».
48
 The “crusader” Tavella had chosen to work in Bangladesh (as he 
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did in several other developing countries) to train farmers to breed 
cattle.
49
 
 According to the Bangladeshi authorities, Tavella’s murder was 
planned, but he was not the objective. The attack was rather directed 
against the Western presence, activities and interests in Bangladesh. The 
Bangladeshi authorities and the Prime Minister denied the presence of IS 
cells in Bangladesh.
50
 
 According to the Italian diplomatic and intelligence authorities 
cooperating with the Bangladeshi investigators, the attack was 
deliberately directed against Tavella, yet the reasons for the murder had to 
be clarified.
51
 However, the thesis supported by the Bangladeshi 
authorities, according to which the terrorists’ targets were not specific 
individuals but foreigners as such, seems to be more plausible, as shown 
by the assassination of a 65 year old Japanese farmer, Kunio Hoshi, on 3 
October. Kunio was killed by three masked gunmen, who shot him while 
he was on the way to his farm in Rangpur.
52
 The murder was claimed on 
the same day by the IS, but the Prime Minister, who met the journalists at 
her residence on 4 October, once again denied any IS involvement. She 
asserted that the killings of the two foreigners were «part of a conspiracy 
to tarnish the image of the government».
53
 The paradoxical nature of these 
rather indiscriminate attacks is highlighted by the fact that Kunio Hoshi 
had recently converted to Islam.
54
 The murderers kill people who are 
either concerned about Bangladesh’s development or who share their 
assailants’ faith.  
The murders of two foreigners in less than a week increased the 
alarm of Western authorities. Before the killings, the Australian and 
British embassies had informed their citizens that «there is reliable 
information to suggest that militants may be planning to target Western 
interests in Bangladesh».
55
 After Tavella’s murder, the Canadian Embassy 
issued a web site alert to its nationals, informing them that «attacks cannot 
be ruled out and could be indiscriminate. Terrorist attacks could occur at 
any time and could target areas frequented by expatriates and foreign 
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travellers. Limit your attendance at events where Westerners may gather, 
for example in hotels or conference centers».
56
 The message issued by the 
American authorities warned that «in case of increased threat, US citizens 
should maintain a high level of vigilance and situational awareness and 
should exercise caution in public places including restaurants, hotels and 
other places frequented by foreigners».
57
 Before Tavella’s killing, Cricket 
Australia (CA) delayed the arrival of its cricket team in Bangladesh 
because of security concerns. The Australian authorities had received 
«reliable information» on the possibility of attacks by Islamic militants. A 
few hours before Tavella’s murder, the Bangladesh authorities had already 
provided the Australian team with the highest security.
58
  
Attacks on foreigners represent a serious threat to Bangladeshi 
business, which depends upon foreign investments, export of Bangladeshi 
goods and delocalisation in Bangladesh. One of the main disruptive 
effects of the climate of terror spreading in the country is its negative 
consequences for the economy. Investors—especially in the ready-made 
garment sector, which is the backbone of Bangladesh economic 
development—have cancelled their trips to the country.
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Sheikh Hasina promised prompt action to capture the culprits of the 
attacks on foreign citizens.
60
 Once more, the government blamed the 
opposition for the violence against foreigners.
61
 
On 5 October, a 52 year old Bangladeshi pastor from Pabna survived 
a vicious assault by three men who came to his house, pretending to be 
interested in learning about Christianity. The assailants, between 25 and 
30 years old, attacked the pastor with knives. The man suffered minor 
injuries.
62
 Less than two weeks later, on 18 November, an Italian 
missionary and doctor, Piero Parolari, was gunned down by three men 
while riding his bicycle to church in Dinajpur. The assailants fled on a 
motorbike. The priest survived the wounds. Parolari had been living in 
Bangladesh since 1984.
63
 IS claimed responsibility for the attempt.
64
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Alok Sen, leader of the Hindu-Bouddho-Christian Unity Parishad in 
Faridpur, survived an assassination attempt. The assailants were armed 
with kitchen knives. The attempt on the religious leader took place on 24 
November, the day after Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mojaheed’s burial in 
Faridpur.
65
 
Besides the attempts on individuals, the terrorists carried out attacks 
on religious crowds and holy places. The Shia community was repeatedly 
targeted between October and December. The first strike took place on 24 
October, the day of Ashura, when a series of bomb blasts killed a boy and 
wounded over a hundred people gathered for a procession in the old part 
of Dhaka. When claiming responsibility for the attack, IS defined the 
religious gathering as «polytheist rituals».
66
 
An almost identical attack killed 16 people during a Shia procession 
in Pakistan hours earlier, but the Bangladeshi Home Minister, 
Asaduzzaman Khan, denied any involvement of extremists or any 
connection between the two attempts. The minister, as usual, blamed the 
opposition for «aiming only to destabilize the situation of the country».
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The attack provoked consternation in the country, as the day of Ashura in 
Bangladesh has been peacefully celebrated for some four hundred years 
and the Shia community had rarely been under attack in the past.  
National and international experts, including the Italian Ambassador 
and the Italian media,
68
 shared the Home Minister’s doubts about IS 
involvement in the violence that upset the country throughout the year. An 
international relations expert who did not want to be identified noted that 
militant organisations have the tendency to attack targets where 
«casualties are likely be higher», ensuring that their names make 
headlines across the world. «By all means, this seems to be a conspiracy 
at maligning [sic] the global image of Bangladesh», he said.
69
  
On 26 November, three young men stormed into a small mosque in 
the Bogra district and opened fire indiscriminately on the worshippers 
during the function after locking the main gate. The muezzin was killed 
and three people were wounded. The attack has been claimed by IS, but 
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the authorities continued to question IS’s involvement and suspected that 
the banned Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) might have been 
behind the attack.
70
  
On 5 December, three crude bombs exploded outside Kantaj Temple 
in Dinajpur during a religious gathering. At least ten people were injured, 
three of them seriously.
71
 The attempt took place in Faridpur, Ali Ahsan 
Mohammad Mojaheed’s birthplace, the same area were Parolari was 
assaulted a month earlier.  
IS involvement in the attacks in Bangladesh is not beyond doubt. 
The hypothesis that the mainstream opposition parties may exploit radical 
Islam as an instrument to destabilise the country and topple the 
government cannot be discarded. Indeed, this hypothesis is shared by 
most analysts and by the Bangladeshi government alike. As shown above, 
the latter has consistently denied the affiliation of the killers to Islamic 
State and «blamed domestic Islamist militants and parties for 
orchestrating the violence in a bid to destabilise the nation».
72
 
 
 
5. A wave of arrests 
 
At the time of writing this text, the attitude of the police regarding 
the assassinations was unclear. As already seen, in some cases the police 
did not take proper action to protect the victims who reported harassment 
and did not take any measures to protect them. The Bangladeshi 
authorities have been under international pressure, including in 
consideration of the high exposure of foreign citizens living in 
Bangladesh and the size of foreign investments in the country. The 
police’s reaction only came in August 2015, perhaps after government 
pressure. Since then, the police have become very efficient and have 
carried out a series of notable arrests. When the violence against 
foreigners became an embarrassing issue, the police, about a week after 
Niloy’s August assassination, arrested two suspects, Saad al-Nahin 
and Masud Rana, both members of the banned ABT. Nahin was on bail on 
the charge of attempted murder of another blogger in 2013. A further three 
men were arrested shortly afterwards, on 17 August 2015. They too 
belonged to the ABT. According to a spokesman for the Rapid Action 
Battalion, a paramilitary police unit, Touhidur Rahman, a 58 year old 
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British national of Bangladeshi origin, was the «mastermind and financier 
of the attacks» on Avijit Roy and Ananta Bijoy Das.
73
 Another of the three 
arrested, Sadek Ali Mithu, 28, acted as the «bridge» with the alleged head 
of the ABT, Mufti Jasim Rahmani, in jail for the assassination of a 
blogger in 2013. The third man arrested, Aminul Malik, 35, apparently 
was not directly involved in the murders, but helped the ABT militants to 
escape abroad by furnishing them with forged passports. By the beginning 
of September, the police had arrested seven militants.
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Cesare Tavella’s alleged killers were arrested a month after his 
assassination, on 26 October 2015. Dhaka police held four people, three 
of whom have been identified as Tavella’s killers.
75
 The suspected 
assailants of the Italian priest Piero Parolari were held immediately after 
the attack. The Secretary General of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Mahbubur 
Rahman Bhutto, has been arrested, while ten more people have been held 
in custody.
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At the end of November, the police detained two members of the 
Jamaat-e-Islami. One of them spread pro-Caliphate propaganda on 
Facebook under the pseudonym Jihadi John.
77
  
On the evening of 4 November 2015, commandos, armed with 
machetes, rode on motorbikes up to a checkpoint in Baroipara, in the 
Dhaka suburbs, and assaulted the stationing policemen. Three were 
seriously injured and one was killed. Most probably the attempt was a 
retaliation against the police for the crackdown of the previous months.
78
 
Between October and November, another three attacks on policemen were 
carried out and another officer was killed.
79
  
At the end of the year, on 24 December, the police raided a building 
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in the capital and seized a massive quantity of weapons and explosives, 
including bombs, grenades, suicide belts and substances to produce at 
least 200 bombs. In the operation, the police detained seven men 
associated with the banned Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh. When the 
raid started, the militants exploded bombs, fortunately without 
consequence.
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Apart from the arrests, the Bangladeshi government also took 
several measures to combat radicalism at the international level. 
According to security and intelligence sources in Dhaka, Bangladeshi 
diaspora communities in the UK finance and encourage young 
Bangladeshi radicals to join the international jihad. The Jamaat-e-Islami is 
very active in East London. Two of three British citizens recruited by IS 
and killed by drone strike in Syria in August 2015 were of Bangladeshi 
origin. Sheikh Hasina urged David Cameron «to do more to combat 
radicalism, as British jihadists play a prominent role in fomenting the 
Muslim radicalism in Bangladesh». «The British government should take 
more steps on the ground», the Bangladeshi Prime Minister told the 
press.
81
  
In November, the Bangladeshi government, considering that the 
criminals made use of apps and social media, decided to block Viber, 
WhatsApp and the social media for some days. On 11 November, the 
Prime Minister announced to parliament the decision to suspend the 
internet connection in the country for some days.
82
 Most probably, the 
internet blackout allowed the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory 
Commission (BTRC) to put into operation Internet Safety Solutions, a 
system to monitor the social media and cyber activities. Several agencies 
have been involved in efforts to prevent cybercrimes.
83
  
 On 23 December, the second secretary in Pakistan’s high 
commission in Dhaka, Farina Arshad, was recalled to Islamabad 
following a request by the Bangladeshi authorities. She was suspected of 
having financed a member of the Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh on 
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trial for espionage.
84
  
 
 
6. Bangladesh’s Muslim radicalism: identity and financial sources 
 
In a year, the Bangladeshi authorities arrested 15 IS suspects.
85
 
Nevertheless, official sources continued to deny any IS involvement in the 
series of bloody attacks that shocked the country in 2015. Most attacks 
and murders have been claimed by IS and most of the arrested seem to 
have actually been connected with the group. However, as maintained by 
the government, the opposition may be involved in most, if not all, the 
attacks, through its militant wing, the Jamaat-e-Islami.  
In a context like the intricate Bangladeshi political scene, it is 
difficult to identify the dividing line between domestic political radicalism 
and international militancy. Political identities and demands are changing 
in Bangladesh, where there are no less than 125 Islamist militant 
organisations. Seven of them are prominent: the already mentioned 
Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), AQIS and Jamaatul Mujahideen 
Bangladesh (JMB); plus the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-
B), the Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT), the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh 
(JMJB), and Sahadat-e Al-Hikma (SAH).
86
 Among them, the most active 
groups are the ABT and JMB. They may be connected with IS, as claimed 
by IS itself after the attacks and confirmed by information obtained from 
the arrested. As far as AQIS is concerned, in September 2014, Ayman Al-
Zawahiri, in a video released by Al-Qaeda, announced the formation of a 
new body: «Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent».87 
The emergence of violent radical Islam in Bangladesh may be 
explained by the competition between Al-Qaeda/AQIS on one side and IS 
on the other. Both organisations aspire to obtain the international 
leadership of Islamic extremism and both seek maximum visibility for 
their actions. AQIS may try to strengthen its presence in South Asia in 
order to claim a role in a post-American Afghanistan and in a post-
Zawahiri Al-Qaeda, remaining active in a region—South Asia—where Al-
Qaeda has its historical roots. On its part, IS may be engaged in 
challenging Al-Qaeda’s influence in South Asia. In fact, at the end of 
January 2015, IS announced its formal establishment in the Af-Pak 
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region.
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According to Abul Barkat, Professor of Economics at Dhaka 
University and an expert in the economics of fundamentalism, the 
Bangladeshi Islamist extremist organisations are «the militant front of the 
mainstream Islamist Party», the Jamaat-e-Islami. JI has created «a state 
within a state» and an «economy within an economy» in Bangladesh.
89
 
The Jamaat has established its presence in most sectors of Bangladesh 
civil society and economy: NGOs and microcredit, madrasas, mass media, 
banks and finance, the pharmaceutical industry and healthcare, real estate, 
trade and transport. Professor Barkat has calculated that the Jamaat’s 
annual net profit amounts to about US$ 278 million. The largest part of 
JI’s income, 27.5%, derives from bank, insurance and finance. The second 
main source of income, 18.7%, is from the NGOs. About 10% of the total 
amount goes to the party’s political activities. The strongest business 
lobbies in Bangladesh are connected with the BNP and JI, and many 
persons accused of war crimes control this business. Mir Quasem Ali, a 
Jamaat-e-Islami executive committee member sentenced to death for 
crimes against humanity in the 1971 war, was a business tycoon and the 
director of the Islamic Bank of Bangladesh Ltd. (IBBL), Jamaat’s 
principal source of funding. The IBBL has been involved in illegal 
activities, some of which were carried out on Jamaat’s behalf. In 2006, 
Mir Quasem Ali was prosecuted under the Money Laundering Act for 
crimes committed through the IBBL. The Islamic Bank of Bangladesh 
was founded in 1975 at the initiative of the Saudi Ambassador in Dhaka, 
Fuad Abdullah Al Khatib, and has become one of the largest banks in 
South Asia, with 60% of its shares held by Saudi Arabian subjects. 
Recently, the IBBL extended its connections with the Islamic world, 
forging links with the Razee Bank of Saudi Arabia. Besides IBBL, Jamaat 
controls fourteen other banks, including the Islamic Bank Foundation 
(IBF), an affiliate of IBBL. Mir Quasem is the chief of the IBF and of the 
Saudi Arabian NGO Rabeta-al-alam-al-Islam. With other NGOs like the 
Kuwait Relief Fund and the Al-Nahiyan Trust from Saudi Arabia, Rabeta 
runs several projects in Bangladesh.
90
 Therefore, the government’s 
explanation for the insurgence of Islamic radicalism in Bangladesh seems 
to be correct. IS is probably a label to cover a network of local political 
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movements and organisations coordinated by JI, with the common dual 
objective of overthrowing the secular tradition and values represented by 
the Awami League since the foundation of Bangladesh and attacking the 
local religious minorities, namely Shia Muslims, Hindus and Christians.  
 
 
7. Will IS proliferate in Bangladesh? 
 
The attention of international experts, analysts and governments is 
focused on Syria, Libya, Afghanistan and other areas in the Middle East 
and Africa, considered the core of IS and international jihadism. 
Bangladesh is somehow neglected as a potential laboratory and a 
manpower reserve for international terrorism. However, Bangladesh, the 
world’s third most populous Muslim country, should not be 
underestimated as a potential recruiting ground for radical Islamic 
organisations. The same applies to the huge Bangladeshi diaspora. Even if 
it is not possible, at present, to quantify the phenomenon, Bangladeshis 
living in Great Britain and other European countries are a fertile recruiting 
ground for radical Islamic organisations. For instance, in April 2015, an 
entire family of eleven people based in Britain disappeared. It reportedly 
joined the Islamic State in Syria. At the beginning of July, IS posted a 
message asserting that the family was «safer than ever with the Islamic 
State».
91
  
Adherence to radical Islam is a phenomenon which involves middle 
class families living in metropolitan cities in Bangladesh or abroad. They 
are isolated, tend to lose their family networks and, therefore, recognise 
themselves in the religious community that symbolically replaces the 
extended family.
92
  
The Bangladeshi diaspora, along with Islamic charities, is the main 
source of IS financing. The reasons—which explain the growth of Islamic 
radicalism among Bangladeshi youths, both in their homeland and 
abroad—are similar to those which apply to other Muslim youths living in 
Muslim countries, in Europe and in the United States: unemployment, 
lack of prospects, social and political exclusion, lack of government 
measures and discrimination have created space for radical Islam. Within 
the mosques, these youths feel acknowledged and involved. Those who 
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join the armed units are well paid. Jihad becomes a job.
93
 In 2014, the 
unemployment rate among Bangladeshis in the UK over 16 years of age 
was 13.4%, which, as far as unemployment is concerned, made them the 
third most affected community in the UK after Pakistanis (16.9%) and 
Africans and Caribbeans as a whole (15.3%).
94
 IS is able to capitalise on 
the lack of social and economic integration not only in Western societies, 
but also in Bangladesh.  
Besides political violence, the country is still affected by social 
insecurity and a lack of fundamental rights. Among the many other 
challenges Bangladesh has been facing since its foundation, from poverty 
to climate change and environmental problems or women rights, two are 
particularly alarming: the violence against minors and the labour 
conditions. 
 
 
8. Minors at risk 
 
Between July and August 2015, three teenagers and a small girl 
were brutally killed. Muhammad Samiul Alam Rajon, 13 years old, was 
killed in Sylhet on 8 July. He was tied to a pole and tortured for about an 
hour. On 3 August, in Khulna, Rakib Hawladar, a 12 year old, was 
tortured to death with unthinkable cruelty. On 4 August, Sumaiya Akter, a 
3 year old girl, died after being heavily beaten by her parents. The next 
day, Robiul Awal, 15 years old, was beaten to death for allegedly having 
tried to steal food. Rakib Hawladar was murdered by the owners of the 
garage where he had worked because he moved to another nearby garage. 
Witnesses reported that the boy had previously been harassed and tortured 
on many other occasions. Sumaiya Akter’s father, Emran Hossain, was a 
carpenter who had fallen into debt. In order to earn some money, he and 
his wife duped people into thinking they had supernatural powers and 
could exorcise them from evil spirits. The couple used the girl to simulate 
a ritual, where she was beaten to expel the evils from her body. These 
facts attracted people’s attention.  
A friend of Rakib Hawladar witnessed part of the scene and reported 
the facts to the local media. The boy was rescued, although too late, by 
bystanders who, after his death, broke into the garage and brought the 
owners to the attention of the police. Rajon’s murder was filmed and the 
video went on Facebook. It outraged the public and stirred a public outcry 
across the country. One of Rajon’s murderers, Kamrul Islam, managed to 
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flee to Saudi Arabia, but was caught by some Bangladeshi expatriates and 
handed over to the police. The post «#JusticeforRajon» circulated on 
Twitter, Facebook and the main social media. In November, four men 
involved in Rajon’s murder and two in Rakib’s murder were sentenced to 
death, to the cheering of the crowd gathered outside the court.
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Thanks to the public uproar, the police were compelled to act 
promptly. On 12 August, people were arrested for Rajon’s murder, while 
Rakib and Robiul’s killers and Sumaiya’s parents were arrested on the 
spot.
96
 According to the Bangladeshi Shishu Adhikar Forum (BSAF)—a 
Dhaka based organisation promoting children’s rights—at least 154 
children were killed in Bangladesh between January and June 2015, 292 
in 2014 and 180 in 2013.
97
 Children in Bangladesh are victims of rape, 
sexual and other kind of abuse, and are often killed for insignificant 
reasons.
98
 These facts prove not only that children’s rights in Bangladesh 
are still not respected and that childhood is exposed to tremendous risks, 
but also that the combination of poverty and ignorance can be deadly. All 
the murders described above had economic motives: Rakib was a working 
child; Robiul was compelled to steal food; Sumaiya died because of her 
parents’ economic problems; Rajon came from a poor family.
99
 The poor 
in Bangladesh are powerless and are often blackmailed by criminals. 
Children fall prey to sexual exploitation, child labour and kidnapping for 
illegal trafficking.  
On 14 March, the dead body of ten year old Abu Sayeed was 
discovered in the house of a police officer in Sylhet. When arrested, the 
man confessed that the boy had been abducted. The General Secretary of 
the Sylhet Ulama League and an officer of the Rapid Action Battalion 
were involved in the murder. The kidnappers had demanded a ransom of 
500,000 Taka—less than 5,000 euros—from Sayeed’s family.
100
  
Child suicide is on the increase in Bangladesh. In 2014, about 95 
children took their own lives. According to the experts, children are 
depressed because they are affected by poverty, child marriage and child 
labour, and are forced to take responsibilities they cannot bear at an age 
when they should only study and play. In metropolitan areas, there are not 
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even playgrounds, as land is being used to erect buildings and shopping 
centres. Children play on the streets and are frequently victims of 
accidents.
101
 
Children have always been exploited and abused in Bangladesh. The 
people’s fierce reaction and the role of social media in denouncing the 
crimes prove that awareness of children rights is increasing, but also that 
much has still to be done. 
 
 
9. The Rana Plaza issue 
 
Other powerless subjects in Bangladesh are factory workers, 
especially those employed by Western garment firms. According to a 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) report published on the occasion of the 
second anniversary of the Rana Plaza disaster of 24 April 2013,
102
 the 
workers continue to suffer from poor working conditions, «physical 
assault, verbal abuse, forced overtime, unsanitary conditions, denial of 
paid maternity leave, and failure to pay wages».
103
 
After the Rana Plaza collapse, the Western retailers set up two 
consortia, the Accord on Fire and Building Safety—a group of 180 
companies based mainly in Europe—and the Alliance for Bangladesh, 
representing 26 North American firms. The two institutions have helped 
Bangladeshi businessmen to improve the structures of their firms and to 
set up an inspection regime. The two organisations oversee more than 
2,000 factories. On its part, the Bangladeshi government has facilitated 
the registration of new unions. These now number about 400, three times 
more than in 2012. According to the HRW report, workers who try to 
form unions are often intimidated, dismissed or physically assaulted.
104
  
The Clean Clothes Campaign—an alliance of unions, NGOs and 
other organisations in sixteen European countries—has been campaigning 
since the April 2013 tragedy, demanding that companies and retailers 
compensate the families of the victims and the injured. The Clean Clothes 
Campaign has exposed many world famous companies whose clothes 
were produced by the factories housed in the Rana Plaza building and has 
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mobilised more than a million consumers.
105
  
In September 2013, representatives from the Bangladeshi 
government, local and international garment companies, trade unions and 
NGOs came together to form the Rana Plaza Coordination Committee. 
With the International Labour Office (ILO) acting as a neutral chair, the 
Committee aimed «to develop a comprehensive and independent process» 
to support the victims, their families and the workers, according to 
international standards.
106
 In January 2014, the ILO set up the Rana Plaza 
Donors Trust Fund to collect the financial resources to refund loss of 
income and the medical expenses faced by the victims and their families. 
The ILO was the sole trustee. The fund was financed by a combination of 
donors, including buyers, companies and individuals who wished to make 
a voluntary donation.
107
 In November 2014, the Rana Plaza Coordination 
Committee announced that about US$ 30 million was required to cover 
the refund costs.
108
 In April 2015, a week before the anniversary of the 
Rana Plaza disaster, 21 million dollars had been collected and nine 
million were still missing. Benetton, which sourced clothes from a Rana 
Plaza factory, eventually promised to donate 1.1 million after denying any 
connection with the factories in the collapsed building. Benetton’s 
donation came after protests and a petition signed by one million people 
asking the Italian corporation to donate alongside other Western 
companies.
109
 The companies were supposed to contribute on the basis of 
their share of production at Rana Plaza factories, according to ILO 
compensation conventions. Benetton’s share was 1.8%. The Italian 
company donated an extra 500,000 dollars to BRAC, the main 
Bangladeshi NGO.
110
 Other Western companies that manufactured in 
Bangladesh but not in the collapsed building, donated to the fund: the 
US$ 30 million target was eventually reached in June 2015.
111
 
On 1 June 2015, the Bangladeshi authorities filed murder charges 
against 41 people for the Rana Plaza collapse. Among the accused were 
the owner of the building, Sohel Rana, his parents, the owners of seven 
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factories housed in the complex, and some government officials. Initially, 
the defendants were charged with culpable homicide, but later the court, 
due to the gravity of the accident and at the investigators’ request, decided 
on a charge of murder. In the latter case, the defendants risked the death 
penalty, whereas the maximum punishment for culpable homicide in 
Bangladesh was only seven years in jail. The investigators changed their 
attitude after discovering that the management of the factories, on the day 
of the accident, forced the workers to enter the building despite the fact 
that it had developed major cracks the previous day. The police defined 
the Rana Plaza collapse a «mass killing». Other charges were related to 
the violation of safety rules, as additional floors had been built up over the 
existing five and had illegally housed additional factories. In December, 
the court issued arrest warrants and ordered the seizure of the properties 
of 24 suspects who had absconded. The defendants were asked to report to 
the police, in order to be arrested, by 27 January 2016.
112
  
 
 
10. A promising economy constrained by political turmoil 
   
Despite a slight decline in economic growth in the fiscal year (FY) 
2015
113
 and all the challenges it was facing (on which more below), 
Bangladesh, according to the World Bank and the IMF, advanced 14 steps 
from 58
th
 position in the world economy in 2013 to 44
th
 position in 
2015.
114
 Indeed, Bangladesh’s economic growth did well in the first half 
of FY15.
115
 The growth rate was 6.4%—a good result, but far below the 
7% rate expected by the government.
116
 According to the World Bank, the 
GDP growth rate should rise to 7.5–8% to accelerate the poverty 
reduction and improve shared prosperity.
117
 In the second part of 2015, the 
World Bank and the Asian Development bank had to revise their growth 
forecasts respectively to 6.8% and 6.7%, while inflation was expected to 
remain at about 6.2%.
118
 
There is no survey-based evidence on poverty reduction in 
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Bangladesh since 2010; however, it is assumed that the sustained GDP 
growth of approximately 6% has been the result of agricultural growth of 
3.3% and remittance growth of 6.7%, which, taken together, made 
possible an annual poverty decline of 1.74% between 2000 and 2010.
119
  
During the year under review, the global growth recovery—in 
particular in the US and Europe—had positive repercussions on 
Bangladesh, while the low international commodity prices favoured the 
investments and helped to contain inflation. The 12 month average 
inflation decelerated from 7.6% in February 2014 to 6.8% in February 
2015.
120
  
The fiscal deficit was stable. The total budget deficit in the first half 
of FY15 amounted to 108.96 billion against 118.70 billion in the same 
period of FY14.
121
  
The Eighth Pay and Service Commission suggested a 100% salary 
increase for civil servants. It was recommended that the lowest basic 
salaries be raised from 4,100 Taka (US$ 52) to 8,200 Taka, and the 
highest basic salaries from 40,000 (US$ 510) Taka to 80,000 Taka. The 
government planned to implement the Commission’s recommendations 
gradually, beginning in FY16.
122
  
Despite its promising results, Bangladesh’s economy was exposed to 
several challenges. In 2015, the political turmoil took a heavy toll on the 
economy and tested the resilience of Bangladesh’s growth. Disruptions to 
domestic transportation due to the blockades in the first months of 2015 
broke the supply chains. The apparel sector, which improved after the 
Rana Plaza reforms, recorded losses due to order cancellations, shipment 
delays and vandalism. Retailers cancelled trips and orders, shifting them 
to India, China, Pakistan, Myanmar, Vietnam and Indonesia. The 
Bangladesh Shop Owners’ Association, which represents 2.5 million 
retailers, reported that sales dropped from 30 billion to 9 billion Taka a 
day.
123
  
Disruptions also had a negative effect on revenue collection, which 
in the first four months of FY15 was 3.2 lower than the corresponding 
period of FY14.
124
 The pessimistic investment climate was confirmed at 
the end of 2015, due to the persistent risk of political instability. 
125
  
Besides political unrest, other risks threatened Bangladesh’s 
development. The financial sector was weak due to rigid lending rates, 
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nonperforming loans, financial scams and lack of accountability in bank 
management.
126
 The land market was very inefficient because of long 
delays and high costs in property registration, lack of ownership data, 
weak computerisation of land records, poor zoning laws and high 
transaction costs. The availability of land for manufacturing enterprises 
was insufficient.
127
 
On 18 February 2015, the government approved a proposal to 
establish 17 special economic zones (SEZs) to attract local and foreign 
investors. However, the implementation of infrastructural projects was 
poor as a consequence of resource constraints, unrealistic targets and 
procedural lapses between the initiation and the completion of the 
projects. Corruption was often behind the delays. Sometimes projects 
were approved far beyond the planned inception date. Procedural delays 
and post-approvals held back the projects’ start-up. Key projects started in 
2014, mostly with foreign investments—such as the Dhaka-Chittagong 
four lane highway, the double tracking Dhaka-Chittagong railway, the 
Dhaka metro rail, the Moghbazar Flyover, the two Bibiyana gas power 
plants and others—were proceeding disappointingly slowly.
128
  
Apart from domestic factors, Bangladesh is expected to face global 
challenges in the short and medium term. The slowdown of the European 
economy may compromise Bangladesh’s export competitiveness in the 
main European markets. Moreover, exports to the European Union risk 
being cancelled or reduced if Bangladesh does not succeed in improving 
labour and safety standards in the garment sector.
129
 
Female employment is the key factor in Bangladesh’s short and 
medium term development. The country is facing a potential decline in 
GDP growth from the present 6% to 5.7% in FY17, because of both the 
labour force’s decline and reduced growth in productivity. The labour 
force has begun to decline because of ageing, wider access to education 
and migration. There is a chance to increase the labour force growth by 
improving female employment, however: women make up a little over 
half the national population, but their contribution to the country’s 
economy is far below its potential. In spite of significant progress in 
recent times, the labour market remains divided along gender lines and the 
promotion of gender equality in employment has stalled. It has been 
estimated that if female labour participation rates were to rise by 2.1 
million a year for ten years, pushing up the total female participation to 
75% of its full potential and reaching the level of Thailand in 1990, the 
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growth rate would rise to 7.3%. The leverage to stimulate women’s 
participation is developing early childhood and tertiary education, 
technical training, and reducing legal and social impediments to pursuing 
a profession.
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11. India-Bangladesh ties grow up 
 
«Hum paas paas hain, hum saat saat bhi hain» (literally, «we are 
close close, we are also together together»). 
131
 The sentence sounds like a 
line of a ghazal, but it is part of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 
talk on the occasion of his two-day visit to Bangladesh on 6 and 7 June 
2015. «We are close and united» was the ultimate meaning of Narendra 
Modi’s words.  
India is adopting a leading role in the region, with the objective also 
of containing China’s expansion into the Bay of Bengal. In this context, 
Narendra Modi’s visit to Bangladesh was the first tangible act of 
rapprochement between the two countries after the tensions caused by the 
territorial dispute dividing them and Modi’s electoral and post-electoral 
declarations about Bangladeshi illegal immigrants in India. In fact, during 
his electoral campaign in 2014, Modi declared that if the BJP came to 
power, the «Bangladeshis would have to pack their bags and leave 
India».
132
 In June 2015, however, the Indian Prime Minister carefully 
avoided the subject. On Modi’s initiative, the land boundary agreement—
which had been inked in 1974, namely 41 years before, but never 
ratified—became effective on 6 June 2015. The agreement swapped 160 
enclaves on both sides of the border, whose residents, up to that moment, 
had been stateless people. The enclaves were created in the eighteenth 
century by princely rulers and were like islands where stateless people of 
either country used to live. The Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) 
allowed about 51,000 people to choose between Indian and Bangladeshi 
nationalities, also giving them the right to decide to stay where they were, 
or to move to the other country.
133
 
In June 2015, Bangladesh and India signed 22 more agreements and 
Memoranda of Understanding, including «blue economy» and maritime 
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cooperation agreements. India obtained the use of the Chittagong and 
Mongla ports. Chittagong was developed through Chinese investment, 
like several other major ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. 
Apparently in a rather paradoxical development, India will be able to 
make use of an infrastructure built by her main rival for influence in the 
Indian Ocean region. In fact, this development is not as paradoxical as it 
appears, but is the result of a tripartite agreement between Bangladesh, 
China and India.
134
 Part of this agreement is the fact that India will build 
the infrastructure that will facilitate the traffic of goods not only between 
the Indian state of West Bengal and Bangladesh, but also between China 
and the Indian Ocean.
135
 Also, China continues to be the main supplier of 
military equipment to Bangladesh and Dhaka’s «most dependable 
partner», according to official sources.
136
 On the other hand, India is 
emerging as Bangladesh’s potential key partner in the energy sector. In 
fact, India has agreed to raise the power supply to Bangladesh from 500 to 
1000 MW and has supported a sale to the Bangladesh Power 
Development Board of 3000 MW at a cost of US$ 3 billion. In addition, 
two coal-fired plants with a capacity of 1600 MW are expected to be set 
up by the Indian corporation Adani Power, at a cost of US$ 1.5 billion. 
Last but not least, Narendra Modi announced a line of credit of US$ 2 
billion to Bangladesh, while Sheikh Hasina pledged zero tolerance of 
terrorism.
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